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allows workers to care about other job characteristics. The empirical analysis focuses on 
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Abstract
In this paper we dene and estimate measures of labor market frictions using data
on job durations. We compare dierent estimation methods and dierent types of
data. We propose and apply an unconditional inference method that can be applied
to aggregate duration data. It does not require wage data, it is invariant to the way
in which wages are determined, and it allows workers to care about other job charac-
teristics. The empirical analysis focuses on France, but we perform separate analyses
for the USA, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands. We quantify the monopsony
power due to search frictions and we examine the policy eects of the minimum wage,
unemployment benets and search frictions.
1 Introduction
During the past decades, a literature has emerged that emphasizes the importance of labor
market frictions and the resulting labor market ows for the understanding of labor market
outcomes like wages and unemployment (see Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, for a survey).
In this paper we aim to quantify the amount of search frictions in the labor market. We
dene an index of search frictions as the average number of job oers that a worker receives
during a spell of employment (that is, during a time period between two unemployment
spells). The larger this number, the smaller the degree of frictions. This number is relevant
for wage determination: if it is large then it is relatively easy for workers to leave a rm
for another rm, so it reects the power of workers vis-a-vis employers.
We develop and apply a number of ways to estimate the index of search frictions. These
are distinguished by data availability and the extent to which theoretical restrictions are
imposed on the model. In all cases we postulate that direct job-to-job transitions are
driven by the desire to improve one's position on the labor market, so that the new job
has a higher value than the old job. The simplest case is the standard partial on-the-job
search model where workers are only interested in the wage of a job (see e.g. Mortensen,
1986). In that case, a sample from the joint distribution of wages and job durations at the
individual level basically suÆces to estimate the index of search frictions. Such data are
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typically provided by longitudinal micro surveys. We demonstrate that, as an alternative
approach, one may discard wage observations and estimate the index from data on job
durations only. Estimation can be carried out with micro data but also with various types
of aggregate data on job durations. This alternative approach does not impose that workers
are only interested in wage improvement but also allows them to care about other job
characteristics. The estimated index is robust with respect to what drives wage dispersion
at the individual level and with respect to which job characteristics determine the job
value. It does not require estimation of a wage (oer) distribution and it is also robust
with respect to the level of an institutional wage oor like a minimum wage.
In the paper we estimate the index in a number of dierent ways with micro as well as
aggregate data from France and from other countries. The results clarify the usefulness of
the various approaches. Approaches based on aggregate data are potentially useful when
micro panel data are not available or suer from small numbers of observations or high
attrition rates.
It is well known that the presence of search frictions gives employers a certain amount
of monopsony power. Basically, if the worker's valuation of the job is strictly smaller than
the value of the marginal product of the workers, then the rm may still maintain a positive
workforce, because it takes time for the worker to nd a better job. The extent to which
employers can exploit this depends on the speed at which workers can move to other jobs.
We use the estimated index of search frictions to quantify the average monopsony power,
dened as the average fraction of the revenue product that is not given to the worker. This
is not possible without additional data and assumptions, for the reason that it requires
a quantication of the dierence between the match value and the share given to the
worker. Here we assume that jobs are fully characterized by wages, and that wages are
determined according to the equilibrium search model of Van den Berg and Ridder (1998),
which extends the model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) (see Van den Berg, 1999, and
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, for surveys of equilibrium search models). Basically, the
estimated index of search frictions and data on the mean wage are used to back out the
mean revenue product.
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With this in hand, it is possible to perform policy analyses, by computing counterfactual
measures of the degree of monopsony power. We focus on the mandatory minimum wage,
or, more generally, the institutional wage oor. A minimum wage decreases the amount of
monopsony power. We contrast the eect of changes in the minimum wage to the eect of
changes in the amount of frictions in the labor market. It turns out that a minimum wage,
although being a simple and transparent policy measure, is inferior as a means to reduce
monopsony power, compared to measures that reduce frictions and stimulate mobility.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 deals with methods of inference on
labor market frictions. Section 3 presents the empirical analyses for France. In Subsection
4.1 we apply our methods to aggregate data from a few other European countries, whereas
in Subsection 4.2 we discuss diÆculties with application to the U.S. labor market. Section
5 concerns the policy analyses. Section 6 concludes.
2 Inference on the amount of labor market frictions
2.1 A simple model of job-to-job transitions
We start by briey presenting the standard partial on-the-job search model with repeated
search. Suppose that workers only care about the value of an index of job characteristics w.
In this subsection we callw the wage of the job. Workers obtain job oers, which are random
drawings from the wage oer distribution F (w), at an exogenous rate . Whenever an oer
arrives, the decision has to be made whether to accept it or to reject it and search further
for a better oer. Layos accrue at the constant exogenous rate Æ. Employed workers then
accept any wage oer that exceeds their current wage. Concerning unemployed workers we
assume that their optimal job acceptance strategy is characterized by a reservation wage
r.
The quantity k := =Æ equals the average number of job oers in a given spell of
employment. To see this, condition rst on the length of the employment spell and compute
the expected number of oers. The Poisson distribution with intensity rate  over a time
period with length h has expectation h. So over a given length d of the employment
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spell, the expected number of oers equals d. Then the unconditional expectation of the
number of oers equals E(d) = =Æ. We take the latter as our index of search frictions.
It equals the rate at which job opportunities arise as a fraction of the rate at which they
are needed. The quantity k plays a major role in the equilibrium specication of the wage
oer distribution in equilibrium search models (see the surveys mentioned in Section 1).
1
A low value of Æ may be a result of stringent job protection laws, and thus may reect an
important source of labor market frictions. For this reason, we do not focus exclusively on
=Æ as the index of search frictions, but we also examine the value of .
In this model, rms do not oer a wage below r, because they would not attract any
workers. This implies that all oers are acceptable to the unemployed. The lowest wage
oer w will not be strictly larger than maxfr; w
min
g either (where w
min
is the mandatory
or legal minimum wage), because otherwise the prot ow could be increased by reducing
this lowest oer.
Let the distribution of wages paid to a cross-section of employees have distribution
function G. To distinguish G from F we call G the cdf of earnings. Earnings are on average
higher than wage oers because workers stay on average longer in higher paying jobs. In
the steady state, ows into and out of the stock of employees with a wage less or equal to
w are equal. We show that this implies that
G(w) =
F (w)
1 + k(1  F (w))
; (1)
We normalize the measure of employed workers to 1. The ow out of employment has
measure Æ. In the steady state this equals the ow into employment. The stock of employees
with a wage less than or equal to w has measure G(w). The ow into this stock consists of
unemployed who accept a wage less than or equal to w. This ow is equal to the fraction
F (w) of the total ow into employment, so this equals F (w)  Æ. The ow out of this stock
1
In empirical studies, the estimated values of  and k are often positively correlated across markets
with the estimated value of the job oer arrival rate of unemployed workers (see e.g. Ridder and Van den
Berg, 1997). Therefore,  and k may also capture the amount of frictions for the unemployed. Van den
Berg and Van Vuuren (2001) argue that  and k depend less strongly on other model determinants than
the job oer arrival rate of unemployed workers.
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consists of those who leave employment (measure ÆG(w)) and those who receive a job oer
that exceeds w (measure (1   F (w))G(w)). Equation (1) follows. Usually, this relation
is derived within an equilibrium search model (see e.g. Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). In
such models, F is derived, but for (1) F can be taken as a primitive.
2.2 Conditional inference
For expositional reasons we discuss conditional (on w) inference on the index of search
frictions before we discuss unconditional inference. In the present subsection we take w to
equal the wage in the job, we assume that workers are only interested in wage income, and
we assume we have access to a sample from the joint distribution of elapsed job durations
and wages among currently employed workers. Note that this joint distribution can be
obtained from cross-sectional data if one is prepared to use retrospective information. In
practice such information may be absent or unreliable, and one may want to allow for other
job characteristics. This is why in the next subsection we examine unconditional inference.
From the job exit rate (1 F (w))+Æ of a worker who currently earns w, it is clear that
the conditional distribution of job durations given w yields a direct estimate of  as the
coeÆcient of 1  F (w). This can be performed straightforwardly by maximum likelihood.
The dierence of the job exit rate at the lowest and at the highest wage is precisely equal
to , and the job exit rate at the highest wage equals Æ, but it is not attractive to use
these relations for estimation because the observation of extreme wages is very sensitive to
measurement error. Flinn (2002) estimates the model with maximum likelihood, allowing
for measurement errors.
We now discuss an alternative approach that is insensitive to measurement errors and
that is very easy to carry out. It exploits the steady state condition (1) for worker ows.
From this equation,
1
Æ + (1  F (w))
=
1
Æ(1 + k)
+
k
Æ(1 + k)
G(w) (2)
Hence, the model of repeated search and the steady state conditions imply a linear relation
between the average length of a job spell given w and the cdf of earnings at w. Note that
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this provides an overidentifying restriction, because the data allow for a nonlinear relation.
More importantly, the ratio of the slope coeÆcient and the intercept is an estimator of
k. In the next subsection we show that the hazard rate of the distribution of elapsed job
durations given w is also equal to Æ + (1   F (w)). So, the left-hand side of (2) is also
the average elapsed job duration given w. One may therefore estimate k from a regression
of the average elapsed duration of employed workers with a wage w on the fraction of
the employed workers who have a wage of w or less. One may also estimate k from the
equality of the reciprocal of the left-hand side of the above equation and the reciprocal of
the right-hand side (this expresses the hazard rate given w as a function of G(w)). Note
that G is directly estimable, either by the empirical cdf of wages or by a parametric cdf.
As noted, conditional inference requires one to assume that the wage is the only job
characteristic that matters for the individual's behavior. Gronberg and Reed (1994) and
Hwang, Mortensen and Reed (1998) examine equilibrium search models where rms set
wages as well as values of non-wage job characteristics. In equilibrium, rms with a high
innate labor productivity oer higher wages as well as better values of the non-wage char-
acteristics. This suggests that the wage may proxy the over-all value of the job.
2.3 Unconditional inference
Readily available data from the OECD and similar sources (see Sections 3 and 4) contain
information on a number of quantities that are related to job durations and ows into
and out of jobs. These quantities are unconditional on job characteristics like the wage
in the job. To derive their counterparts in the model we have to integrate w out of the
conditional job duration distribution. If k is identied from these quantities then, contrary
to the previous subsection, the inference is robust with respect to which job characteristics
drive the job-to-job transitions. A similar approach can be applied to micro data in which
the information on wages is discarded.
To proceed, we need to distinguish between three dierent unconditional distributions
of job spells. They are dened for three dierent populations: (i) the population of workers
who move from unemployment to employment at a given point in time, the E-inow
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population, (ii) the population of workers who start in a job at a given point in time, the
J-inow population, and (iii) the population of workers who are employed at a given point
in time, the E-stock. The J-inow diers from the E-inow because the former contains
workers who make a direct job-to-job transition, and these will accept on average higher
w than the workers who ow in from unemployment. If we integrate out w, we introduce
unobserved heterogeneity in an exponential duration distribution. As a consequence, the
duration density in the stock diers from that in the inow (see e.g. Ridder, 1984).
For the inow populations the conditional distribution of job durations t given w has
density
'(tjw) = (Æ + F (w))e
 (Æ+F (w))t
(3)
with F := 1  F . The only dierence between the E-inow and the J-inow concerns the
distribution of w, which has density f(w) in the E-inow, and density
'(w) =
k
log(1 + k)
f(w)
1 + kF (w)
in the J-inow (see our working paper version Ridder and Van den Berg, 2002, for a
derivation). We obtain
Proposition 1 (i) The density of the job duration t
uj
in the E-inow is
'(t
uj
) =
e
 Æt
uj
Ækt
2
uj
h
1 + Æt
uj
  (1 + Æ(1 + k)t
uj
)e
 Ækt
uj
i
=
1

Z
Æ+
Æ
ze
 zt
uj
dz
(ii) The density of the job duration t
j
in the J-inow is
'(t
j
) =
1
log(1 + k)
1
t
j
e
 Æt
j
h
1  e
 t
j
i
=
1
log(1 + k)
Z
Æ+
Æ
1
z
h
ze
 zt
j
i
dz
(iii) The density of the job duration t
e
in the E-stock is
'(t
e
) =
Æ(1 + k)
k
Z
Æ(1+k)
Æ
1
z
e
 zt
e
dz
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Several points are worth noting. First, assumptions on the shape or the determinants of the
distribution of job characteristics w are not required for these results. So estimates based
on the above densities are valid irrespective of the type of heterogeneity that determines
the dispersion of w. The results are also robust with respect to the level of an institutional
wage oor like a minimum wage, because w does not aect the above densities. Indeed, F
does not aect the densities at all.
2
All densities can be expressed as a mixture of exponential distributions, with dierent
mixing distributions that in all cases have a support [Æ;  + Æ]. This implies that all un-
conditional duration densities have a decreasing hazard rate. For the E-inow the hazard
decreases from Æ+
1
2
 to Æ, for the J-inow it decreases from = log(1+k) to Æ, and for the
E-stock from Æ(1 + k)(log(1 + k))=k to Æ.
On average, job spells are much longer than unemployment spells. To obtain a reason-
able number of complete job spells, one must either rely on retrospective information on
elapsed job spells, or one must follow a cohort during a long observation period. Retrospec-
tive information concerning a rather distant past may be unreliable due to recall errors.
We can avoid these biases by censoring the job durations at a relatively short observation
period. In repeated cross-section data, an alternative method is available to obtain a direct
estimate of a job exit rate over some observation window, by computing the empirical
hazard for this observation period. This corresponds to the calculation of retention rates
(see Section 3). We use both methods.
For all three job spell distributions the hazard decreases to Æ for long job spells. The
dierence between the hazard at duration zero and the hazard at innity is informative on
. If we censor the job spells after a relatively short observation period then it is diÆcult to
recover Æ, and, by implication, . (For reasonable parameter values this is diÆcult even if
the censoring is after 20 years.) We therefore estimate Æ from external data. Specically, we
estimate an auxiliary model with data on the unemployment rate and the unemployment
duration distribution to estimate Æ (see Appendix A1). Given a value of Æ, we can estimate
2
The myopic search strategy of employed workers as well as the assumptions that unemployed workers
are homogeneous and ows are in equilibrium are important for these results. In the working paper version
Ridder and Van den Berg (2002) we examine the robustness of the approach with respect to this.
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 from data on short job spells.
3
It is useful to provide some more intuition on the identication of  and k. Consider
data on t
uj
among individuals who owed into employment at time zero. Just after time
zero the value of w among them is randomly distributed according to the distribution F . If
they receive a job oer just after time zero then in 50% of all cases this is acceptable. So on
average the job exit rate just after time zero equals Æ +
1
2
. After a while the workers who
started with a low w leave their job, so the composition of survivors tilts towards workers
with high w. These have lower job exit rates, so the observable average rate decreases.
By using the observed job exit rate at time zero to estimate , we eectively use the
fraction of short job spells compared to the value of Æ in order to determine the amount
of search frictions in the market. A relatively large number of short job spells is taken as
evidence that workers are able to move on very quickly to better jobs, so that frictions are
unimportant.
We now compare the information in the data on short job durations in the dierent
sampling designs that can be used for unconditional inference. Let 
i
denotes the hazard
of t
i
at duration 0. It can be shown that

uj
  Æ =
1
2
Æk = Æg
1
(k)

j
  Æ = Æ
k
log(1 + k)
  Æ = Æg
2
(k) (4)

e
  Æ = Æ
(1 + k) log(1 + k)
k
  Æ = Æg
3
(k)
The left hand side of these equations can be estimated by the empirical hazard rate for
short job spells. By the delta method the accuracy (asymptotic variance) of the resulting
estimate of k is determined by the inverse of the derivatives of g
1
; g
2
; g
3
. The derivatives
satisfy 1=2 = g
0
1
> g
0
2
> g
0
3
> 0, and hence data from the E-inow are more informative
3
Simulations in our working paper version Ridder and Van den Berg (2002) show that data on longer
job spells are uninformative on . This problem is exacerbated if  is itself small.
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than data from the J-inow which in turn are more informative than data from the E-
stock. To give an example: if the observed 
e
=Æ equals 2.2 then the implied k equals 5.5.
But if the observed 
e
=Æ equals 2.4 then k equals 7.4. Thus, a 9% increase in the observed
variable leads to a 35% increase in the value of k. Given the fact that published aggregate
data are rounded and also contain other measurement errors, a 9% error in the value of an
observable should not be considered as uncommon.
Note that the ranking of the informativeness of the data ignores dierences in the
sampling variation in the data. On the one hand, one may argue that the latter are all
small if they concern the whole population or are based on very large samples. On the
other hand one may argue that certain types of data suer more from measurement errors,
although it is hard to guess their relative magnitude.
Of course, unconditional inference uses less information than conditional inference.
Conditional inference exploits the eect of the wage regressor on the job exit rate, whereas
unconditional inference focuses on the duration dependence pattern of the job exit rate
due to unobserved heterogeneity. The former approach is more robust from an econometric
point of view, whereas the latter is more robust from a theoretical point of view.
3 Empirical analysis for France
3.1 The data
The French data we use are all extracted from the yearly French Labor Force Survey (LFS),
the Enque^te Emploi. The individual records of these data have been used extensively in
the empirical labor economics literature (see e.g. Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg,
2000). For the conditional (on wages) estimation of the search frictions index we also use
the individual records. These data are not published. The unconditional inference uses
aggregated versions of these data. We use published data from the OECD on labor market
ows. Their accessibility makes inference based on them potentially attractive. In addition,
we aggregate the micro data ourselves, to shed more light on the quality of the various
approaches.
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The LFS is a rotating panel in which households participate for three consecutive years.
They are interviewed once per year. In the rst year, data are collected on the job spell
with the current employer. The duration is in months if shorter than 2 years and in years
if longer. In 1991, 27962 individuals were interviewed, and of these 14131 were employed;
10432 worked 35 hours or more per week; and 10210 reported a monthly gross wage. We
eliminated some observations with very small and large wages (below 3000 and above 30000
French Francs). Among the remaining 9963 individuals, 9854 reported a job spell. This is
the sample we use for the conditional inference as well as for the unconditional inference
based on our own aggregations. Figure 1 gives the marginal distribution of elapsed job
durations t
e
, by year (41 means 41 years or longer). Note that there is no evidence of
heaping.
Concerning the published aggregate data we use the 1995 distribution of elapsed job
durations over a small number of duration intervals, as published in OECD (1997). In
addition, Table 5.10 in OECD (1997) provides the separation rate from 1 year to 2 years,
which is calculated as the dierence between the number employed with tenure less than
1 year in 1994 and the number employed with tenure between 1 and 2 years in 1995, as
a fraction of the former. This is the fraction of jobs with a duration less than a year that
are dissolved within a year, or the separation rate for new jobs, or one minus the retention
rate for new jobs. We denote the reported separation rate by s
1
(the index denotes the
maximum elapsed job duration in the baseline year).
Table 1 presents some summary statistics of the labor markets in France and the coun-
tries we consider in Section 4. In the sequel we do not report standard errors. In cases
where there are fewer parameters than observations, these standard errors depend on the
details of the sample design, and these details are not available to us.
3.2 Conditional inference results
In Subsection 2.2 we showed that the theory predicts a linear relation between the average
job spell and the earnings cdf. To check this relation we grouped wages by 5% intervals
and computed the average job spell for each wage interval. The results are in Figure 2.
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We conclude that the predicted relationship holds well. A linear regression gives R
2
= 0:93
and k = 1:4.
In Table 2 we report ML estimates of k as a parameter of the job duration hazard, for
dierent right-censoring values for t
e
. In the hazard we substitute the empirical cdf of wages
for G (this gives the same equation as (2)). The estimate becomes larger if we censor the
observations progressively, up to k = 4:7 if censoring is at 2 years. This suggests that the
relation between the job exit rate and the wage is dierent at high durations, for example
because k and Æ are not constant and homogeneous. Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg
(2000) structurally estimate equilibrium search models for dierent sectors, using micro
data from the LFS covering 1990{1993. The models impose that w is the wage and the
inference exploits wage information. Their implied estimates of k are around 5. Note that
our estimator may be downward biased because the \regressor" is measured with error, as
we use an estimate of G instead of the population G.
3.3 Unconditional inference results
We start with the estimation using published aggregate data. Estimation of k from data
on s
1
as dened in Subsection 3.1 is non-trivial. First of all, the sample is not a genuine J-
inow sample but rather a sample from the stock of jobs with a duration less than one year.
Secondly, the exit rate out of jobs decreases within the interval considered. To proceed,
we have to derive the joint density in the E-stock of the elapsed job duration t
e
and the
residual (or remaining) job duration t
r
. The observation s
1
then equals
s
1
= Pr(0 < t
r
< 1j0 < t
e
< 1)
By analogy to the derivations in Subsection 2.3 we obtain
s
1
= Pr(0 < t
r
< 1j0 < t
e
< 1) = 1 
R
Æ+
Æ
1
z
2
e
 z
(1  e
 z
)dz
R
Æ+
Æ
1
z
2
(1  e
 z
)dz
The estimated k is well above 20, which is much higher than what is typically found
in the literature, and certainly much higher than the conditional inference estimates men-
tioned in the previous subsection. The empirical distribution of individual elapsed job
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durations in the LFS reveals that France has a high fraction of jobs with a duration of
less than or equal to a year (see Figure 1; spells up to two years are very frequent). This
is not compatible with the shape of the unconditional job exit rate at higher durations in
the current formulation of our model. Cohen, Lefranc and Saint-Paul (1997) argue that in
France there are many jobs with a predetermined xed duration mostly occupied by young
workers. In particular, they argue that one can distinguish two types of job contracts: 1)
with a predetermined xed short duration, with low ring and dissolution costs, and low
wages, mostly occupied by new entrants and other young workers and 2) with indetermi-
nate long durations and high ring costs. Basically, the type-1 workers bear the burden of
labor market exibility.
One may remedy this inference problem by allowing for population heterogeneity in Æ
and/or .
4
Another approach is to use data on separation rates s
T
for larger T , since these
are less sensitive to the shape of the job duration density close to zero. Table 5.9 in OECD
(1997) provides the separation rates from 0  < 5 years to 5  < 10 years of tenure. This
gives an observation of s
5
. In eect, we compare 1980{1985 with 1985{1990. The expression
for s
5
is the same as for s
1
, provided we replace Æ and  by 5Æ and 5, respectively. This
gives the results on k and  reported in Table 3 for France. These are plausible and very
close to the results mentioned in the previous subsection.
Note that the conditional inference results on k are not necessarily aected by the
large fraction of short job spells, because those results are driven by the empirical relation
between w and the job exit rate, and this relation may be similar in both types of jobs.
Next, we turn to unconditional inference with the published data on numbers of elapsed
job spells in a small number of duration intervals. The quasi-ML estimate of k is implausibly
small, and the t to the duration data is poor. The estimates are sensitive to small changes
in the value of Æ, but changing this value does not result in a better t. This conrms our
suspicion that these unconditional elapsed job duration data are uninformative on k.
Finally, we turn to unconditional inference with the micro LFS data used in the previous
4
We experimented with a model in which the index of search frictions k was set at a particular value and
the job destruction rate Æ followed a two-point mixture. This improved the t to the observed distribution
of job spells. See our working paper version Ridder and Van den Berg (2002).
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subsection, where we now discard the wage information. This corresponds to using the
individual elapsed job spells that underlie the published data from the previous paragraph.
The results are the same as in the previous paragraph. This means that these results are
not due to the aggregation into duration intervals. The estimates are also sensitive to the
degree in which we right-censor t
e
.
We conclude that unconditional inference with the separation rate for new jobs is
sensitive to institutional features of the French job contracts system. One needs to consider
the separation rate for all jobs with an elapsed duration between 0 and 5 years to obtain an
estimate that conforms to conditional inference estimates. Finally, unconditional inference
with data on elapsed job spells is not informative on the index of search frictions.
4 Empirical analyses for other countries
4.1 United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands
We briey report unconditional inference results for three other European countries. We
rely again on the published data from OECD (1997). These are obtained from the yearly
national Labor Force Surveys (LFS), a standardized survey that is conducted in all EU
countries. The standardization facilitates comparisons of the results. The data years are
the same as for France.
For the Netherlands and the UK we report the estimates based on s
1
. Estimation with
s
1
-data gives implausible results for Germany. Like for France, the estimated k is well above
20, which is much higher than for the other countries. Again, this is due to a high fraction
of jobs with a duration of less than or equal to a year. And again, this can be remedied by
using data on s
5
(see the results in Table 3).
Next, we consider the marginal frequency distribution of elapsed job spells over a small
number of intervals. Like for France, the estimates of k are implausible and the t to the
duration data is poor.
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4.2 United States
In Appendix A1 we estimate Æ using a simple auxiliary model of labor market ows that
ignores temporary lay-os, voluntary quits from employment into unemployment, and new
entrants and re-entrants that move from non-participation into unemployment. These are
important phenomena in the U.S. labor market. Ignoring them may lead to over-estimation
of Æ because the inference assumes that the full unemployment inow consists of lay-os.
The estimated Æ is indeed quite large, leading to a short average duration between successive
unemployment spells. This in turn may lead to under-estimation of k. However, as we shall
see, the estimate of k is still higher than for the other countries considered, so that the
ranking of countries is not aected by this.
The U.S. data we use are similar to the French data, the Current Population Survey
(CPS) taking the role of the French LFS. We perform conditional inference using individual
records from the January 1991 supplement (see the working paper version Ridder and Van
den Berg, 2002, for details). The unconditional inference uses published data from OECD
(1997) based on aggregations of CPS data. The distributions of elapsed job spells are from
1996. The separation rates are calculated by numbers of employed in dierent duration
intervals in 1995. The CPS is not harmonized with the European LFS, and this limits the
comparability of the results.
The conditional inference shows that, like for France, the predicted linear relation be-
tween the average job spell and the earnings cdf holds well. Like for France, the conditional
inference estimates with censoring are higher than without censoring, up to k = 6:1 if cen-
soring is at 2 years. In all cases, the estimates of k and  are higher than the corresponding
estimates for France. Table 3 reports the unconditional inference estimates based on s
1
.
These may seem large compared to the conditional inference estimates for the U.S. and
to the unconditional inference estimates for the other countries. However, the estimated
job oer arrival rate for employed workers is close to the U.S. job oer arrival rate for
unemployed workers (see e.g. Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991), which is much higher
than its European counterparts.
Estimation of k from the marginal frequency distribution of interval-aggregated elapsed
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job spells leads to the same problems as for the other countries.
The results in this section reinforce the methodological conclusions of the previous
section. Unconditional inference with the separation rate for new jobs is sensitive to insti-
tutional features. Unconditional inference with data on elapsed job spells is not informative
on the index of search frictions.
The most important substantive conclusion of Sections 3 and 4 is that labor market
frictions are largest in France and Germany, and smallest in the United Kingdom and the
United States, with the Netherlands in between these groups of countries. This ranking
is robust with respect to the method of inference. In the next section we examine the
implications for wages and for policy.
5 Policy analyses
5.1 Monopsony power
We dene the average monopsony power or monopsony index as follows,
 =
E(p  w)
E(p)
(5)
In this equation, p is the revenue product or match value (or simply productivity) of a
single worker. We take expectations over individuals in the labor force instead of rms, so
we examine monopsony power from the perspective of the worker. In this section we restrict
attention to the case where the wage is the only job characteristic of concern to workers.
To quantify , it matters how wages are determined. This is because E(p) is unobserved,
and we can only estimate it by using observations of w and applying the inverse of the
mapping between p and w that follows from the wage determination process.
We postulate that the wage determination process is such that at the aggregate level
the following relation holds,
E(w) =
k
1 + k
E(p) +
1
1 + k
E(w(p)) (6)
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where the notation w(p) for the lowest wage maxfr; w
min
g highlights that it may be a
function of p by way of the reservation wage r of the unemployed. Equation (6) can be
rationalized by the equilibrium search model of Van den Berg and Ridder (1998). In this
model, the total labor market consists of separate segments within which each worker-rm
match has the same productivity p. This productivity may be dispersed across segments,
but k is the same across segments. Only segments with p > maxfb; w
min
g are protable,
where b is the value of leisure. This can be shown to imply that p > w(p) for each protable
p.
Substitution of (6) in (5) gives
 =
1
1 + k
E(p)  E(w(p))
E(p)
(7)
Alternatively,  can be expressed in terms of k, E(w) and E(w(p)),
 =
E(w)  E(w(p))
(1 + k)E(w)  E(w(p))
(8)
E(w) is observed, and k has been estimated, so it remains to quantify E(w(p)). If r < w
min
for all p then E(w(p)) = w
min
, which is observed. Otherwise we need a model to express w(p)
and the distribution of p across segments in terms of observables or estimable quantities.
We use the full Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) model for this purpose as well as to
determine whether r < w
min
for all p. Appendix A2 gives details.
5.2 Eects of policy changes
From equation (7), the only feature of the wage distribution that aects the degree of
monopsony is the average of the lowest wage over all workers. Consider now the role of
w
min
. If it exceeds r for a certain segment with a certain p then a further increase in it
shifts the whole wage oer and earnings distributions upwards. That is, it redistributes the
rents of the match by lowering the prots of all employers and raising the income of all
workers. In eect, it decreases the monopsony power of rms. However, if the minimum
wage exceeds the productivity p, then rms will close, and all workers become permanently
(structurally) unemployed. (The same holds if b > p.)
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In the limiting case where w
min
equals p for each segment, the value of  attains its
minimum value 0. Similarly, if k is innite then E(w) = E(p) and again  = 0. If, on the
other hand, k = 0 and w(p) = 0 for every p then  attains its maximum value (which is
1). This suggests that it is interesting to contrast wage oor policies to policies that aect
the amount of frictions.
The estimates and observations needed to quantify  (see Subsection 5.1 and Appendix
A2) can be used to compute a number of counterfactual monopsony indices. In particular,
we consider (i) the eect of reducing unemployment benets, while leaving the minimum
wage unaected, (ii) the eect of reducing the minimum wage, while leaving the unem-
ployment benets unaected, (iii) the eect of eliminating both the minimum wage and
unemployment benets, and (iv) the eect of making search on the job impossible.
5
To quantify  we require wage data. We use categorized wage data from the early 1990s
on before-tax monthly wages of full-time employees who worked during the whole year (see
our working paper version Ridder and Van den Berg, 2002, for details). The minimum wage
and unemployment benets levels are taken from CPB (1995). We use the estimates of k
in Table 3. Table 4 lists the estimates of the monopsony indices.
For all countries the average monopsony power is smaller than 5%. For this reason it
is more informative to consider counterfactuals that increase the monopsony index than
counterfactuals that decrease this index. Elimination of unemployment benets and of the
minimum wage barely increases the monopsony indices. The index for the counterfactual
k = 0 shows convincingly that the main protection of workers against the monopsony
power of rms is provided by the ability to move to high-wage jobs.
6
5
Note that the actual productivity distribution is truncated from below at the minimum wage. All
counterfactuals that involve a reduction of the minimum wage below its current level must be interpreted
with care. A reduction of the minimum wage lowers the truncation point of the productivity distribution,
and the eect of this extension on the monopsony index depends on the untruncated density at the new
minimum wage. In general, the average productivity will decrease with a decrease in the minimum wage.
Because we do not want to rely on the estimated productivity density below the truncation point, the
counterfactuals assume that the average productivity does not change with the minimum wage.
6
Note that the estimate of k is almost perfectly negatively related to the employment protection ranking
in Table 1.
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Although our analysis is too simple for a careful welfare analysis of the minimum wage,
it is clear that the argument that the minimum wage is needed to protect workers against
monopsonistic employers is not convincing. Of course, our analysis does not allow for indi-
vidual variation in the rate of job-to-job transitions, but on average these transitions seem
to protect the workers suÆciently well. Moreover, wage oors create structural unemploy-
ment among less productive workers. If one is interested in worker protection then it is
more useful to focus on policy measures that stimulate on-the-job search and job-to-job
transitions. The former can be implemented by subsidizing agencies that arrange contacts
between workers and rms, or by making the costs of job search tax-deductible. Job-to-job
transitions can be stimulated by subsidizing the costs of moving or by stimulating the use
of insurance and pension schemes that are not restricted to single rms or sectors, so that
workers do not have to give up certain rights when they move between rms or sectors.
Note that higher reservation wages of unemployed workers may also reduce the monop-
sony index. According to equilibrium search models, this can be established by a high
job oer arrival rate for unemployed workers. In that case the reservation wage of high-
productivity workers exceeds w
min
.
At this stage it may be useful to examine which data features drive the policy results,
and how the data have to look like to obtain dierent conclusions. The main equations
that link the parameters of interest to the data are (i) equation (4) or equation (2) for
the relation between the index of search frictions k and the data on short job durations,
and (ii) equation (8) for the relation between the monopsony index  and the wage data,
given k. The policy results follow directly from (ii). It turns out that the policy results are
not very sensitive to the value of k. For reasonable k the monopsony indices are small. If
a newly employed worker obtains on average at least three job opportunities before being
laid o then the monopsony index is always smaller than 0:25. The estimates of k are in
a fairly wide range, depending on the country and the method of inference. In the case
of unconditional inference one would need to observe a smaller fraction of short term jobs
than is actually observed, in order to obtain an estimate of k that generates a large  and
a larger role for wage oor policies. In the case of conditional inference one would need
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to observe a weaker dependence of the job exit rate on the wage quantile than actually
observed, in order to reach such conclusions.
6 Conclusion
We developed and used two approaches to estimate the index of search frictions. The
conditional inference approach is more robust from an econometric point of view, whereas
the unconditional inference approach is more robust from an economic-theoretical point
of view. It turns out that unconditional inference with data on elapsed job spells is not
informative on the index of search frictions. Unconditional inference with the separation
rate for new jobs is sensitive to institutional features. Provided these features are taken
into account, reasonable estimates are obtained.
The methods of inference have deliberately been designed to be easily implementable
and to require only easily available data. In such a case it comes as no surprise that the
data sometimes suggest that there is more heterogeneity than the method of inference can
handle. Nevertheless, the ranking of countries with respect to the index of search frictions
is robust with respect to the method of inference. Moreover, the results on the amount
of monopsony power and the policy eects are unambiguous. For all countries we nd a
small amount of monopsony power. In the absence of job mobility of employed workers, the
monopsony power would be much higher. In the absence of a wage oor, the monopsony
power would only be marginally higher. We conclude that in all countries, job mobility
provides much more protection against exploitation of workers than a wage oor.
Some topics for future research emerge. First, it seems useful to investigate further how
robust unconditional inference with data on separation rates is from an econometric point
of view. Secondly, methods may be designed that allow for more individual heterogeneity
while still being easy to implement.
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Table 1: Some characteristics of the labor markets in the ve countries
NL D F UK USA
Average standardized unem-
ployment rate (1989{1993)
6.9 5.1 9.9 8.7 6.2
Monthly ow out of unempl.
(% of unempl.; av. over 1985
and 1993)
6.6 7.6 3.6 7.7 39.4
Monthly ow into unempl. (%
of empl.; av. over 1985 and
1993)
0.26 0.41 0.33 0.59 2.26
Monthly ow of hires (% of
empl.; av. various years)
0.99 2.63 2.42 { 5.38
Average wedge (%) 44 41 38 29 33
Minimum wage (max. of
statutory and collective;
Euros per year)
14010 9940 10790 7000 7540
Min. wage as frac. wage av.
production worker
0.57 0.38 0.63 0.39 0.35
Average minimum unempl.
benet (Euros per year)
11780 9480 7540 5750 5770
Employment protection rank-
ing
3 5 4 2 1
Germany is West Germany only; sources: OECD Employment Outlooks and CPB (1995).
Table 2: Conditional inference estimates of index of search frictions in France; job
durations censored at year C
Uncensored C = 20 C = 5 C = 2
1.3 2.6 4.2 4.7
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Table 3: Unconditional inference estimates of the index of search frictions
 (per month) k
Netherlands 0.072 9.1
Germany 0.028 6.5
France 0.038 5.0
United Kingdom 0.13 13
United States 0.61 20
Table 4: (Counterfactual) monopsony power indices
Germany Netherlands France United Kingdom United States
 0.0068 0.029 0.025 0.046 0.036

b=0
.010 0.034 0.037 0.046 0.036

w
min
=0
0.0070 0.031 0.027 0.047 0.040

w
min
=b=0
0.011 0.060 0.046 0.063 0.053

k=0
0.62 0.44 0.52 0.69 0.68
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Figure 1: Frequency distribution job durations; France, 1991
Figure 2: Average job duration by 5% wage intervals; France, 1991
24
References
Bontemps, C., J.M. Robin, and G.J. van den Berg (2000), \Equilibrium search with con-
tinuous productivity dispersion: theory and non-parametric estimation", International
Economic Review, 41, 305{358.
Burdett, K. and D.T. Mortensen (1998), \Wage dierentials, employer size, and unem-
ployment", International Economic Review, 39, 257{273.
Cohen, D., A. Lefranc, and G. Saint-Paul (1997), \French unemployment: a transatlantic
perspective", Economic Policy, 25, 267{285.
CPB (1995), \Replacement rates", Working paper, Central Planning Bureau, The Hague.
Flinn, C.J. (2002), \Labor market structure and inequality: a comparison of Italy and the
U.S.", Review of Economic Studies, 69, 611{645.
Gronberg, T.J. and W.R. Reed (1994), \Estimating workers' marginal willingness to pay
for job attributes using duration data", Journal of Human Resources, 29, 911{931.
Hwang, H.S., D.T. Mortensen and W.R. Reed (1998), \Hedonic wages and labor market
search", Journal of Labor Economics, 16, 815{847.
Layard, R., S. Nickell, and R. Jackman (1991), Unemployment; Macroeconomic Perfor-
mance and the Labour Market, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Mortensen, D.T. (1986), \Job search and labor market analysis", in O. Ashenfelter and
R. Layard, editors, Handbook of Labor Economics, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Mortensen, D.T. and C.A. Pissarides (1999), \New developments in models of search in the
labor market", in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, editors, Handbook of Labor Economics,
Volume III, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
OECD (1997), Employment Outlook 1997, OECD, Paris.
Ridder, G. (1984), \The distribution of single-spell duration data", in: G.R. Neumann
and N. Westergard-Nielsen, editors, Studies in labor market analysis, Springer Verlag,
Berlin.
25
Ridder, G. and G.J. van den Berg (1997), \Empirical equilibrium search models", in D.M.
Kreps and K.F. Wallis, editors, Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and
Applications, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Ridder, G. and G.J. van den Berg (2002), \A cross-country comparison of labor market
frictions", Working paper, Free University Amsterdam, Amsterdam.
Van den Berg, G.J. (1999), \Empirical inference with equilibrium search models of the
labor market", Economic Journal, 109, F283{F306.
Van den Berg, G.J. and G. Ridder (1998), \An empirical equilibrium search model of the
labor market", Econometrica, 66, 1183{1221.
Van den Berg, G.J. and A. van Vuuren (2001), \The eect of search frictions on wages",
Working paper, Free University and Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam.
26
Appendix
A1. Estimation of the transition rate from employment to unemployment
We postulate a simple steady-state model of unemployment that allows the stock of unemployed to consist
of two groups: the structurally unemployed with zero exit rate, and the frictionally unemployed with exit
rate 
0
. The latter sub-stock has a changing composition, whereas the former does not. The structural
unemployment rate as a fraction of the labor force is denoted by q. Consequently, the unemployment rate
U equals q + (1  q)Æ=(Æ + 
0
).
We aim to estimate Æ using aggregate unemployment data. It is clear that data on U by themselves
do not identify Æ. We also use data on the frequency distribution of elapsed unemployment durations in
the stock of unemployed. The latter identify 
0
and q, so that Æ is subsequently identied from U .
The amount of structural unemployment as a fraction of total unemployment can then be expressed as
q=U , which will be denoted by . (Consequently, the structural and frictional unemployment rates can be
expressed as U and (1   )U , respectively.) Now consider a large sample from the stock of unemployed
persons. A fraction  has a zero exit rate and innite unemployment durations. A fraction 1    has an
exit rate equal to 
0
. An inow sample of these frictionally unemployed has an unemployment duration
distribution that is exponential with parameter 
0
. It is well known that the corresponding distribution of
elapsed durations in the stock has the same distribution. We do not observe to what type an unemployed
individual belongs. Consequently, the observed distribution 	(t) of elapsed durations t in the stock is a
mixture of a degenerate distribution with a single mass point at innity and an exponential distribution
with parameter 
0
. The survival function equals
	(t)  1 	(t) =  + (1  )e
 
0
t
This is a discrete mixture of exponentials with two mass points, one of which is xed at zero. Aggregate
data provide observations on the fraction of unemployed in a nite number of duration intervals [t
i
; t
i+1
).
The corresponding probabilities equal 	(t
i+1
)   	(t
i
). Thus, the parameters 
0
and  (and therefore q)
can be readily estimated.
The distributions of elapsed unemployment spells and the unemployment rate were obtained from
OECD publications. These are in turn based on data from the Labor Force Survey (NL, D, F, UK) and
the Current Population Survey (US). For the US the unemployment rate is standardized (see the working
paper version Ridder and Van den Berg, 2002, for details).
The parameters 
0
and  are estimated by quasi ML. The estimates obtained by maximizing the
grouped duration likelihood are quasi MLE because neither the LFS, nor the CPS is a simple random
sample. Although the estimators are consistent for a stratied sample, provided that the stratication
variables are exogenous, the standard errors depend on the details of the sample design. Note that the
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Table 5: Oer arrival rate (per month) (
0
) and average unemployment duration (months)
of frictionally unemployed, 1990{91
NL D F UK US
Year 
0
av. dur. 
0
av. dur. 
0
av. dur. 
0
av. dur. 
0
av. dur.
90 0.120 8.4 0.0975 10.3 0.0933 10.7 0.156 6.4 0.563 1.8
91 0.128 7.8 0.101 9.9 0.0936 10.7 0.153 6.5 0.468 2.1
Table 6: Fraction of unemployment that is structural () and job destruction rate (Æ) per
month, 1990{91
NL D F UK US
Year  Æ  Æ  Æ  Æ  Æ
90 0.28 0.00733 0.22 0.00391 0.18 0.00798 0.22 0.00912 0.073 .0304
91 0.26 0.00750 0.21 0.00339 0.16 0.00792 0.15 0.0122 0.080 .0309
grouped MLE is less sensitive to rounding errors in the unemployment durations. We only present the
estimation results for the years 1990 and 1991.
A2. The monopsony power if the reservation wage exceeds the mandatory minimum wage
in certain labor market segments
The Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) model expresses r (and, therefore, w(p)) for each segment in terms
of ; p; b; w
min
; Æ and the job oer arrival rate 
0
for the unemployed. There holds that r <> b i 
0
<> .
If 
0
>  then w(p) for the high productivity workers is equal to their reservation wage that is larger
than the minimum wage. The lowest wage for the low productivity workers is then the minimum wage.
Otherwise, the reservation wage of the unemployed is always smaller than the minimum wage.
Consider the case 
0
> . We t a lognormal distribution to the grouped wage distribution. Next,
we compute the mean and variance of this wage distribution. Finally, we equate the estimated mean and
variance of w to the corresponding model expressions. The result is a nonlinear system that involves the
rst two moments of truncated distributions of p across workers. If we choose a lognormal distribution
for p, we obtain a nonlinear system in the parameters of this distribution, and this system can be solved
numerically, plugging in the estimates of  (see Sections 3 and 4), and Æ and 
0
(see Appendix A1) and
the observations of b and w
min
.
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